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The symbolic status of same-sex marriage
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When the Civil Partnership Act 2004 (‘CPA’)
was introduced in 2004 this was a major
step forwards for same-sex couples. Despite
offering near equalisation of rights with
married couples, this piece argues that this
was insufficient for those same-sex couples
who favour same-sex marriage. This remains
a current issue for jurisdictions which have
not legalised same-sex marriage, including
Northern Ireland and many European states.
This piece argues that civil partnership is a
useful concept allowing public mind-sets to
adjust, en route to the legalisation of
same-sex marriage. However, civil
partnership remains tarred by the brush of
‘separate but equal.’ Aside from the rights
granted by marriage itself, this article
contains an important symbolical status and
is necessary for the recognition of gays as
equal citizens.
Why same-sex marriage remains an
important issue
Although same-sex marriage was legalised in
England and Wales in 2013 and Scotland in
2014, in Northern Ireland there remains
only a right to civil partnership. Further, on
a Council of Europe level there is no right
to same-sex marriage.1 Today 13 countries
in Europe have introduced same-sex
marriage2 and an additional 15 Member
States recognise some form of civil
partnership.3 Yet the protections offered by
the latter status vary widely.4 Some countries
continue to maintain constitutional
provisions defining marriage as between a
man and a woman only.5 This remains an
issue about which although the European
Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’) explains
that despite ‘major social change . . . there is
no European consensus …’.6
When the Civil Partnership Act 2004 (‘CPA’)
was introduced this was a momentous
occasion for same-sex couples. Civil partners
were given very similar legal rights to
married heterosexual couple, ‘with the
exception of a form of ceremony and the
actual name and status of marriage’7. Yet
less than a decade later, it was felt necessary
to enact new legislation to legalise same-sex
1 Schalk and Kopf v Austria (App No 30141/04) (2011) 53 EHRR 20 and Chapin and Charpentier v France (App No
40183/07) (ECtHR 9 June 2016).
2 Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden
and United Kingdom (apart from Northern Ireland).
3 Andorra, Austria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Liechtenstein, Malta,
Slovenia, Switzerland and San Marino.
4 See Kees Waaldijk ‘Great Diversity and Some Equality: Non-Marital Legal Family Formats for Same-Sex Couples in
Europe’ in Kees Waaldijk, Marjolein Van Den Brink, Susanne Burri and Jenny Goldshmidt, Equality and Human Rights:
Nothing But Trouble – Liber Amicorum Titial Loenen (Netherlands Institute of Human Rights, 2016 Sim Special 38).
5 Marriage is defined as a union solely between a man and a woman in the constitutions of Armenia, Bulgaria, Croatia,
Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Serbia, Slovakia and Ukraine. See Helen Fenwick, ‘Same Sex Unions
and the Strasbourg Court in a Divided Europe: Driving Forward Reform or Protecting the Court’s Authority Via
Consensus Analysis’ (2016) 3 European Human Rights Law Review 248.
6 Schalk and Kopf v Austria (n2) para 58.
7 Wilkinson v Kitzinger [2006] EWHC 835 (Fam), [2006] 2 FLR 397 para [49].
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marriage.8 This piece maintains that
same-sex marriage remained a goal worth
seeking because of the symbolic value of
marriage. First it will be considered why the
CPA was not sufficient for proponents of
same-sex marriage, before going on to
outline in further detail the symbolic value
of marriage and the close connections
between marriage and citizenship.
Why the CPA was not sufficient
Although ‘registered partnership take
different forms in different countries’9, the
UK wide CPA enacted in 2004 led to near
equality of legal rights.10 This is in contrast
for example with the French pacte civil de
solidarte (‘PACS’) which although providing
a large range of rights nearly equivalent to
marriage11 did not include citizenship.12 The
CPA was enacted in 2004 following a
consultation with ‘stakeholders and the
public at large’13. This survey found that the
public were not prepared at that time for
same-sex marriage.14 Speaking in the Second
Reading of the Civil Partnership Bill in the
House of Lords, Baroness Scotland linked
the CPA firmly to issues surrounding
religion stating that this was a ‘secular
solution’15. Even Stonewall (one of the
leading gay rights organisations in the UK)
considered at that time that civil partnership
was ‘preferable to marriage’16.
Yet even with similar legal protections to
marriage, for many same-sex couples civil
partnership was insufficient. Civil
partnership by its very existence as a
separate status was often tarred with the
brush of being ‘separate but equal’ and
relegating same-sex couples to ‘second-class
status’17. Marriage was considered by many
as the gold standard18 whilst civil
partnership was compared to the treatment
of blacks in the ‘Jim Crow South’19.
Practical differences also remained. Should a
couple wish to relocate jurisdiction for
instance, civil partnerships receive less
protection from private international law
and EU law than heterosexual marriage.20
Over the course of a decade social attitudes
evolved, and before enacting the 2013
Same-Sex Marriage Act, a government
consultation found that 53% of the
population supported same-sex marriage.21
Despite the criticisms of civil partnership, it
can be argued that it did provide a useful
staging post on the way to same-sex
marriage. Whilst some authors may view
8 Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013.
9 Erez Aloni, ‘Incrementalism, Civil Unions and the Possibility of Predicting Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage’
(2010–2011) 18 Duke Journal of Gender Law and Policy 105 at 111.
10 Ibid. at 122 which described the CPA as the ‘comprehensive model for registered partnerships.’
11 For further explanation see Macarena Saez, General Report ‘Same Sex Marriage, Same-Sex Cohabitation, and Same-Sex
Families Around the World; Why ‘Same’ is so Different’ (2011) 19 American University Journal of Gender Society and
Policy 1 at 25.
12 See Eric Fassin, ‘Same-Sex, Different Politics: ‘Gay Marriage’ Debates in France and the United States’ (2001) 13(2)
Public Culture 215 at 217 .
13 Wilkinson v Kritzinger (n8) at para [51] referring to Baroness Scotland (Hansard, HL 22 April 2004, Col 388).
14 Ibid para [51] referring to Baroness Scotland (Hansard, HL 22 April 2004, Col 388).
15 Baroness Scotland (Hansard, HL 22 April 2004, Col 388).
16 See Aloni (n10) at 156.
17 See Jonah M.A. Crane, ‘Legislative and Constitutional Responses to Goodridge v Department of Public Health’
(2003–2004) 7 New York University Journal of Legislative and Public Policy 465–485 at 471. See also Michael C Dorf,
‘Same-Sex Marriage, Second-Class Citizenship, and Law’s Social Meanings’ (2011) 97 Virginia Law Review 1267.
18 See Wilkinson v Kritzinger (n8) at para [18]. See also Aloni (n) at 110 referring to Yuval Merin, Equality for Same-Sex
Couples The Legal Recognition of Gay Partnerships in Europe and the United States (University of Chicago Press,
Chicago, Illinois,US, 2002) at 55–56 who describes marriage as the ‘privileged and preferred legal status in Europe and
the United States.’ See also George W. Dent Jr. ‘The Defense of Traditional Marriage’ (1999) 15 Journal of Law and
Politics 581–644 at 617 who refers to marriage as bringing many ‘intangible benefits’ including ‘honour, respect [and]
the social stamp of approval.’
19 Elizabeth S Scott, ‘A World Without Marriage’ (2004–2008) 41 Family Law Quarterly 537–566 at 543. See also Richard
. Lombino II, Gay Marriage: Equality Matters, (2004–2005) 14(1) South California Review of Law and Women’s Studies
3 at 17.
20 See Frances Hamilton and Lauren Clayton-Helm, ‘Same Sex Relationships Choice of Law and the Continued Recognised
Relationship Theory’ (2016) 3(1) Journal of International and Comparative Law 1.
21 HM Government, Equal Treatment: The Government’s Response December 2012 at 11 available at
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/133262/consultation-response_1_.pdf
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civil partnerships as stalling progress,22 in
contrast this author considers that ‘civil
partnerships are a useful building block on
the road to the recognition of same-sex
marriage’23. This is because ‘[i]ntermediate
stage legislation allows public opinion to
adjust and develop’24. Interestingly in this
context, the ECtHR has noted the ‘intrinsic
value’ of civil partnerships, ‘irrespective of
the legal effects, however narrow or
extensive’25. The key point however, is that
marriage has a symbolical value which civil
partnership could never bestow. Closely
connected with this are the citizenship rights
which marriage, but not civil partnership
entails. Each of these inter-connected
concepts will be considered in the next
couple of sections.
Symbolism of marriage
Marriage is the key social institution
celebrated and recognised around the world.
Marriage is given great constitutional
importance and ‘assumptions about the
importance of marriage and its appropriate
form have been deeply implanted in public
policy’26. Marriage is also protected by
international conventions27 and dicta in
influential judgments has referred to
marriage as a ‘vital social institution’28 and
one of the ‘basic civil rights of man’
fundamental to our very existence and
survival.29 The majority of the US Supreme
Court in the important 2015 judgment of
Obergefell v Hodges,30 which licensed
same-sex marriage across all states of the
US, stressed that the right to marry as
‘fundamental’.31
Excluding gays from marriage is to exclude
them from an important part of society. The
South African Constitutional court in Fourie
also saw similarities with laws preventing
mixed race marriage and was keen to have a
radical break form the past in recognising
same-sex marriage. Grigolo also comments
that until same-sex marriage is recognised,
that it should be demanded as otherwise
minority groups are allowing themselves to
be ‘relegated to a second-rate position’32.
The Wilkinson v Kritizinger case, which was
determined before the Marriage (Same Sex
Couples) Act 2013 was enacted, contained a
witness statement by Sue Wilkinson, who
was desperately pleading for her Canadian
same-sex marriage to be recognised in
England and Wales.33 For her, offering gays
and lesbians the ‘ “consolation prize’ of a
civil partnership . . . is offensive and
demeaning’.34 For many same-sex couples
marriage was seen as rendering their
‘existing relationship more real’35 and that
marriage would ‘create and make a public a
perception of lasting commitment among
lesbians’36. In conclusion, when marriage is
compared to an extensive civil partnership
rights giving regime, ‘the practical
22 Aloni (No 10) at 105.
23 Frances Hamilton, ‘Strategies to Achieve Same-Sex Marriage and the Method of Incrementalist Change’ (2016) 25
Florida Journal or Transnational Law and Policy 121 at 138
24 Ibid at 138.
25 Oliari and Others v Italy, App Nos. 18766/11 and 36030/11, 21 July 2015 at para 81.
26 See Aloni (No 10) at 141 referring to Nancy Cott, Public Vows: A History of Marriage and the Nation (Harvard
University Press, 2002) at 1.
27 See for example Art 12 of the European Convention on Human Rights which states that ‘Men and women of
marriageable age have the right to marry and to found a family, according to the national laws governing the exercise of
this right.’ Another example is Art 23(2) of the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which states that ‘the right of
men and women of marriageable age to marry and to found a family shall be recognized’.
28 See Crane (n18) at 469 referring to Goodridge v Department of Public Health, 798 N.E. 2d 941 Mass (2003) at
para 948.
29 Yvonne Zylan, States of Passion: Law Identity and Social Construction of Desire (Oxford University Press, 2011) at 224
referring to Loving v Virginia 388 U.S. 1 (1967) at 12.
30 See Obergefell et al v Hodges, Director, Ohio Department of Health (2015) US 576.
31 Ibid. at 11
32 Michele Grigolo, ‘Sexualities and the ECHR: Introducing the Universal Sexual Legal Subject’ (2003) 14(5) European
Journal of International Law 1023 at 1041.
33 See Wilkinson v Kritzinger (No 8).
34 Wilkinson v Kritzinger (No 8) para [18].
35 Julie Shulman, Gabrielle Gotta and Robert-Jay Green, ‘Will Marriage Matter? Effects of Marriage Anticipated by
Same-Sex Couples?’ (2012) 33(2) Journal of Family Issues 158 at 162
36 Mary Dunlap, ‘The Lesbian and Gay Marriage Debate: A Microcosm of Our Hopes and Troubles in the Nineties’ (1991)
1 Law and Sexuality Review Lesbian and Gay Legal Issues 63.
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importance of marriage is overshadowed by
its symbolic importance’.37 This suggests
that the institution of marriage itself carries
abstract weight that cannot be explained
simply by the many benefits understood to
be guaranteed through it.
Marriage and citizenship
An important part of the symbolism of
marriage is its close connection with
citizenship. The ability to form a marriage
has great relevance to an individuals’ status
as an equal citizen.38 The classic formulation
for citizenship comes from Thomas Marshall
who stressed the ‘equal . . . rights and duties
with which the status is endowed’.39 The
close connections between citizenship and
equality are also stressed in the French40 and
Irish constitutions.41 Baroness Hale in a
leading case before the UK House of Lords
also emphasised that ‘[d]emocracy is
founded on the principle that each
individual has equal value’.42 An important
practical effect of the symbolism of equal
marriage is therefore to advance the
citizenship status of same-sex couples.
Same-sex couples who are excluded from
marriage are not truly equal. They have not
been accorded the full status of citizenship43
and are not seen as full members of
society.44 This it can be argued is because of
the public nature of marriage.45 The
personal commitment of two individuals
through marriage, and the citizenship this
entails, leads to many consequences for the
couples ability to ‘participate . . . in the
public order’46. If the couple do not enter a
civil partnership, and do not marry, they
may lose out on many economic benefits
including social security benefits, health
insurances and the advantages of tax and
immigration laws. In short, Brenda Cossman
characterises citizenship as being ‘about the
process of becoming recognised subjects,
about the practices of inclusion and
membership, both social and legal’47. In a
link back to the symbolic value of marriage,
Grigolo explains that ‘only marriage [not
civil partnership] can guarantee the symbolic
benefits of full equality’.48
Conclusion
Civil partnership provides a useful staging
post, allowing ‘public opinion to adjust and
develop’.49 Yet for many civil partnership
was never going to be sufficient because of
allegations that this was a ‘second-class
status’. Marriage itself provides an
important symbolic status and is protected
by international conventions and important
case law. Therefore excluding gays from
marriage is to exclude them their ‘status as
an equal citizen’.
37 Schulman, Gotta and Green (No 36) 177 referring to Corinne Reczek, Sinikka Elliott and Debra Umberson, (2009).
Commitment Without Marriage: Union Formation Among Long Term Same-Sex Couples. (2009) 30 Journal of Family
Issues 738 at 740
38 See for example Nicholas Bamforth, Sexuality and Citizenship in Contemporary Constitutional Argument (2012) 10(2)
International Journal of Constitutional Law 477 at 478. See also Dorf (n).
39 Ibid. at 477–478 referring to Thomas H Marshall, ‘Citizenship and Social Class’ in Thomas H Marshall and Tom
Bottomore (eds) Citizenship and Social Class (Pluto Press, 1992) 18.
40 See for discussion Michael Rosenfeld, ‘Introduction: Gender, Sexual Orientation and Equal Citizenship’ (2012) 10(2)
International Journal of Constitutional Law 340.
41 Constitution of Ireland, Art 40(1). See for discussion Conor O’Mahoney, ‘There Is No Such Thing as a Right to Dignity’
(2012) 10(2) International Journal of Constitutional Law 551.
42 Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza [2004] UKHL 30; [2004] 2 AC 557[132] (Baroness Hale of Richmond).
43 See for example Bamforth (No 39) 484 referring to Diane Richardson, ‘Sexuality and Citizenship’ (1993) 32 Sexuality
83 at 88 (1998) who states that ‘it can be argued that lesbians and gay men are only partial citizens, in so far as they are
excluded from certain of these rights.’ See also Angela P Harris ‘Loving Before and After the Law’ (2008) 76 Fordham
International Law Review 2821.
44 Richard Frimston, ‘Marriage and Non-Marital Registered Partnerships: Gold, Silver and Bronze in Private International
Law’ (2006) Private Client Business 352.
45 See Aloni (No 10).
46 Bamforth (No 39).481 referring to Cott (No 27) 1.
47 Brenda Cossman, Sexual Citizens: The Legal and Cultural Regulation of Sex and Belonging (Stanford University Press,
2007) 27–32.
48 Grigolo (No 33) 1041.
49 See Hamilton (No 24) 138.
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